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ABSTRACT isiam and lsiamic popuiations in Ethiopia havebeen
relatively understudied since the great survey ofJ.S. Trimingham published in
1952. Ethwpian Islam is interesting both because of its antiquity (since the
inceptwn of Islam itself) and because of the particular patterns of interaction and
symbwsis with an, until recently, predominantly Christian culture. A socio-
cultural and historical exportation of patterns of tolérance of Mam and
Chrisuanity since the 16th Century deserves to be developed. In addition the
relationships between religious and ethnie identification among Ethiopia's
diverse populations are not well known and needfurther scrutiny
In the last decade, new issues of religious identity and communal poütical
identity of Muslims in Ethiopia émerge in the wake of the political and socio-
economic reforms in fédéral Ethiopia and the impact of 'globalizat ion 'processes
m the cultural sense. While Ethiopians Muslims have in recent years gone
through a phase of revivalism and self-assertion, they have remained rather
impervious to 'fundamentalist' ideological movements in both a social and
poütical sense.
This article gives a brief historical overview of Mam in Ethiopia, its position
m the pre-1974 empire and its relationship with Christiamty, and the changes
under the Communist Mengistu regime up to 1991. Finally some of the major
changes since 1991 are discussed, presenting challenges for debate andfurther
socio-historical research on the place and rôle of Muslims in Ethiopia and on the
relationshtp of Islam (and Christianity) With 'modernity', ethnicity and group
identity m Ethiopia.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the seminar 'Islam as a Globalizing
i QQÖ T' Globj
ah
u
zatlon Research Group, African Studies Centre (Leiden), 29th April
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1. Introduction
African Islam has many forms, and since the introduction of the faith on the
continent it has been marked by a history of multiple interactions with pre-
existing belief-systems and with Christianity - both imported missionary
Christianity and indigenous forms (Egypt, North Africa, Nubia, and Ethiopia).
In the African context, the rôle and place of Islam in Ethiopia have remained
relatively understudied. However, a deeper understanding of Islam in this country
is of great relevance, not only because of the notable political changes in the
country since 1991, but also in the context of late twentieth-century conditions of
pohtical, economie and cultural globalization which is shaping both domestic
policies and ethnie identification as well as international relations.
A considération of Islam in Ethiopia evokes several interesting questions: (a)
what is thé historical trajectory of Islam in Ethiopia as part of the général
movement of Islam as a world religion in Africa?; (b) what are thé patterns of
coexistence and articulation of Islam - as a faith and a way of life - with
ethnicity, Christianity and traditional religions in Ethiopia?; and (c) will
Ethiopian Islam ideologically connect with global ideological movements of
revivalism and 'fundamentalism', which have been emerging as a counter-
discourse against Western-driven économie and cultural 'modernity'?
In this respect, we start by noting three characteristics of Ethiopian Islam that
cry out for more research:
(a) thé pattern of the spread and adoption of Islam in Ethiopia as part of a
sub-global movement into Africa connected to an intercontinental
tradition of learning and civilization;
(b) the reasons for alternating phases of violence and incorporation in thé
interaction of Muslims with thé wider Ethiopian society; and
(c) thé social organization and 'indigenization' of Islam by ethnie, régional
and social groups in Ethiopia (on this point it should be seen as part of the
wider north-east African région).
Thèse questions will not all be answered hère but they define thé outlines of a
more in-depth study of Ethiopian Islamic populations.
The 'quest for identity' is an expression that can be applied to thé efforts of
Ethiopian Muslims to be recognized, to organize, and to raise their position in thé
country towards parity with thé Christians, who have been politically and
culturally dominant from thé fourth Century until thé 1970s. This quest has been
fraught with difficulties of an historical and political nature, some of which will
be mentioned in what follows.
In the past decade, especially since thé arrivai of a new régime in Ethiopia in
1991 emphasizing thé ethnie identity and public religious equality of Islam and
Christianity, thé issue of Connecting to global developments in Islam as an
expanding world-religion and identity has emerged as a major concern for
Ethiopian Muslims, who had until then been marked by a strong inward
orientation.
An important question at présent is whether Islam in Ethiopia will serve as a
vehicle for political or social mobilization and exclusivist identity, as has
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happened in several other African countries (notably Malawi, Sudan and
Nigeria), where earlier patterns of co-existence between Christians and Muslims
are being redefined in the context of emerging 'fundamentalisms.' This question
is in fact one relating to thé social foundations of Islam in Ethiopia and to thé
political culture of an ex-impérial state.
2. Background
From its very inception, Islam has been a trans-continental religion, in this case
helped by thé proximity of thé African Red Sea Coast to thé Arabian heartland
where it first emerged. In fact thé first converts to thé new religion - outside thé
close circle of thé Prophet Muhammad - are assumed to have been Ethiopians. In
thé year 615, so tradition goes, thé first Hijra occurred: a group of Arab followers
of Islam in danger of persécution by thé dominant Quraysh authorities in Arabia
(Mecca) were advised by Muhammad himself to seek refuge across thé sea, in
thé empire of Aksum, where a '... righteous king would give them protection.'l
These refugees were indeed well-received in Aksum and could practise their
faith freely. Requests from thé Meccan authorities to deliver them back were
refused. The tolérant attitude of thé Ethiopians gave rise to a whole new genre of
Arab literature extolling the virtues of 'the Ethiopians.' The practical effect was
that on the authority of the Prophet himself Ethiopia was not to be seen as a
target forjihad. Undoubtedly there is an economie side to the story: Aksum was
in décline, and the trade from and to the empire was not as attractive as that in the
Middle East, to which the attention of the Islamic conquerors was directed. In the
decades following the death of Muhammad, however, there were various armed
clashes between Ethiopians and Arabians and raids by both sides (see Cuoq
1981: 36-38), also related to the control of the Red Sea trade.
The new faith did not, however, attract many followers in Ethiopia, certainly
not in the highland Christian areas.2 lts expansion was very graduai and mainly
took place in the lowland coastal areas inhabited by pastoral nomads, spreading
later (eleventh-twelfth Century) to the Somali areas in the south-east.
While Ethiopia was thus one of the first countries to receive Islam (later
developing centres of Islamic learning in Harar, Massawa, Zeyla, later Jimma), it
has also seen a notable tendency towards inward orientation, displaying the kind
Tradition cited in Trimingham (1952: 44). However, the first (Arabian) converts from
Islam to Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity can also be traced back to this episode: some
of the exiled stayed on in Aksum and became Christians.
Although Arab-Islamic legends predictably claim that the king of Aksum at the time
(called by Arab sources Ella Asham) converted in secret to the new faith, after a letter
from the Prophet Mohammed. For more on the Islamic mythology, see Hussein
(1996). For an excellent overview of this period and a critical review of the sources,
see Cuoq (l981: 128-38).
During a December 1997 symposium on the Ahmed Nejash mosque in Meqelle
(Tigray), attended by the ambassadors of Iran, Turkey, Yemen and Libya, and
officially opened by the president of Tigray Regional State, the (highly controversial)
assumption was that "Ahmed Nejash" was the "first Ethiopian Muslim king" (Addis
Zemen, Ethiopian state newspaper, 9 December 1997).
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of seclusion and self-sufficiency that was equally characteristic of Ethiopian
Christianity. In addition to the geographical reasons for this, linguistic and
cultural factors probably also played a part. Arabic never was and never became
an indigenous spoken language3 - even most Ethiopian Muslims only knew
Quranic passages and prayers in Arabic (cf. Drewes 1976) - and for many
purposes ethnie and regional identities tended to be as important as religious
identity (see below).
3. Distribution
At present, at least 30% of the Ethiopian population professes Islam.4 The
religion cannot be identified clearly with particular régional or ethnie groups5 and
is found across most of them. Islam is strongly represented in the north-east, east
and south-east and a small strip in the west of the country (Afar, Harari,
Argobba, Somali, Garri, part of the Oromo, part of the Gurage, Beni Shangul).
In Ethiopia - where since the fourth Century a deep-rooted Orthodox Christian
religion was prédominant, especially in thé highland plateau - Islam largely
spread by peaceful expansion, via trade routes and itinérant teachers (many of
Yemeni and Arab origin), tolerated by thé Christian monarchs. This tolérance can
be explained by a variety of reasons, among them thé particular hierarchical
social structure and ethos of the Amhara-Tigray Christians - amongst whom
craft-work and regional and international trade were somewhat despised
activities, in favour of soldiery, peasant-farming, administration and priesthood -
and by the emerging international slave, gold and ivory trade from Ethiopia,
fuelled by Arabian, Yemeni, Hadramauti and Swahili entrepreneur-traders
especially from the twelfth Century. The présence of Islamic groups and
3 Only the Rashaida people in Eritrea, a group ('tribe') of about 5—6000 people that
emigrated from Arabia to Ethiopia in the eariy nineteenth Century, had Arabic as its
mother longue. For a valuable study on the status and use of Arabic (mainly as a
written language) in Ethiopia, see Drewes (1976). This author, a leading authority on
the Semitic languages of Ethiopia, mentions the fact that Amharic has long been an
important language of Islam in Ethiopia, both in ceremonies and in written texts,
although few of the latter have appeared in print (1976: 184).
4 On the basis of the faulty idea that numbers equal importance, a highly partisan
présentation of statistical material on the number of adhérents of the various faiths in
Ethiopia (as on that of the ethnie groups), is repeated time and again by various
authors, without mention of any serious source. E.g. Seifuddin, in a rather flawed
paper (1997: 136), writes of Muslims as being the majority group in Ethiopia, but
again bis source is unclear.
The best course, however, would be to take the Ethiopian censuses of 1984 and
1994 as indicative (they too have a measure of error, but it is a slight one, and evenly
spread). The 1994 census (the official document cited in Ethiopian Register 6(1),
1998, p. 52) gives the number of Muslims in Ethiopia as 14.3 million, or 28.7% of the
population. The 1984 census had counted Muslims as 12.5 million, or 32.9% of the
population). It has to be noted that the 1994 census left out Eritrea: independent since
1993 (ca. 50% of its people - some 1.8 million - are Muslims). In both censuses the
Orthodox Christians are the numerical majority, with more than 52%.
5 Except the numerically less significant Somali, Argobba, Beni Shangul/Berta and
Afar, who are virtually all Muslims.
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Sultanates deep in thé heartland (e.g. Dawaro, Hadiya, later Jimma) at a relatively
early date (late thirteenth-fourteenth Century) may partly be explained by a
strategy of self-protection: in these areas outside the purview of the Solomonic
monarchy, conversion to Islam exempted thé people from being enslaved.
Arab traders, teachers and entrepreneurs have settled in the country and inter-
married with Ethiopians, but on a rather limited scale. Ethiopian Muslims do not
dérive from 'Arab stock' but are indigenous, belonging to thé various ethnie
communities of the country. They only rarely trace descent from prestigious Arab
lineages (an example is thé Mirghani family in Eritrea, see Hiskett 1994: 143).
Some holy men or sheikhs who did so have become the object of vénération and
pilgrimage.
4. Historical patterns
The émergence and identity of Ethiopian Islam has been inextricably linked with
the nature of the Ethiopian state and its economie base, and with Ethiopian
Orthodox Christianity (and vice versa). Both religions are part of one ideological-
religious framework rooted in a multi-ethnic Ethiopian culture. Thus, thé one
cannot be understood without the other. They have had their phases of violent
antagonism and confrontation but in the past centuries have evolved a modus
vivendi of practical everyday co-existence and co-operation, especially in the last
three centuries. This modus vivendi was grounded in the economie activities of
the Muslims, who introduced trade in and markets for new products, serving as
pioneers intensifying trans-national commercial trade relations with countries
outside Ethiopia, and also in common éléments in the underlying cultural fabric
of Ethiopian societies.6
Nevertheless, one fact stands undisputed: despite its ancient history and roots
in the country, Islam in Ethiopia has always been a religion with secondary and,
in the eyes of many Ethiopian leaders inferior, status; it emerged in the shadow
of Christianity and often suffered from suppression and discrimination. This has
had its impact on social opportunities, religieus and civil rights and the patterns
of self-organization of the Muslims.
Due to its link with the 'divinely ordained' Solomonic monarchy, Christianity
inevitably was the core world-view of the political elite and a defining element of
nationhood in a historical sense. Moreover, a majority of the population has
adhered to Christianity since later Aksumite times.
4.1. The seventh Century
Since its arrivai in the seventh Century, Islam only expanded in a modest way,
without spectacular growth. The arid and sparsely populated Dahlak Islands off
the Eritrean coast were the first fully Islamic région where a Sultanate emerged.
On the mainland, Islamic Sultanates were founded from the twelfth Century, and
their rulers paid tribute to the Ethiopian kings, who since ancient times had
6 It is, for instance, notable that a social trait hke patnlateral cross-cousin marnage
(widespread in Arab countries) is still very rare among Ethiopian Muslims, perhaps
only to be found among the Afar and thé Somali.
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claimed sovereignty over the lands up to the coast. Wheneyerthè sujtafates
refüsed to pay, violent conflicts ensued. These «onflicts markeffthe fomcteetith
and fifteenth centuries, with the Christian icmpire usually èmer>ging the1 Winner
(although important direct-trade revenues were lost to the Sultanates, e.g, Yifat
and Adal, see Hiskett 1994: 140).7 ,
4.2. The sixteenth Century jihad
In the first half of the sixteenth Century, under the leadership of a skilled soldier
and Islamic revivalist Ahmed ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi (nicknamed Gragn, the 'left-
handed'), the new Sultanate of Adal (with its centre in the city of Harar) became
so strong that a full-scalejihad was launched against a weakened Ethiopian state.
His forces received essential help from Arab mercenaries and from the Turks,
who had been encroaching on the coast up to the city of Massawa, and who
supplied fire-arms, cannons and matchlock men from their own army to the Adal
forces (the Christian armies did not yet have fire-arms). The stated aim of this
war was to root out and destroy Christianity in the area and to end the Solomonic
monarchy (which had been reinstated in 1270).8 The havoc and destruction
wrought by this 14-year war (1529-1543), during which virtually the whole of
Highland Ethiopia was conquered and a great number of centres of Ethiopian
Christian civilization were destroyed, long shaped the Christian perception of
Muslims as the 'danger from within.' The jihad was finally ended by Christian
'guerrilla' résistance and with the help of a contingent of Portuguese soldiers sent
upon the request (in 1535) of the Ethiopian king and whicharrived in 1541.
Ahmed ibn Ibrahim was killed in 1543. His successor Nur ibn al-Mujahid, who
continued the war until his death in 1568, was less successful. Although Emperor
Gälawdewos was killed in 1559, the Christian empire recovered under emperors
Minas (1559-1563) and especially SärsäDingil (1563-1597).
The background to the conflict was again the struggle for control of internai
and especially external trade routes. The Turkish-Portuguese rivalry can also be
explained in this light. Nevertheless, the deeply ideological-religious aspect of
this war should not be neglected.
4.3. The Gondarine monarchy (sixteenth-seventeenth Century)
The impérial state revived in the late sixteenth Century and flowered until the
1730s. A new impérial capital emerged in the town of Gondar, stimulated by
Emperor Fasilädäs (r. 1632-1667). The policy of the Ethiopian emperors was one
of tolérance vis-à-vis Muslim traders and middlemen, but also réservations
against employing them in important positions in the Christian-dominated state
service and in thé army. As a rule, Muslims were also excluded from obtaining
thé hereditary land right (rist), which was a defining element of highland
Ethiopian Christian culture (among people of Amhara and Tigray). Internally, thé
Muslim communities were accorded autonomy, e.g. in matters of religieus law.
7 It is interesting that in some of thé contemporary chronicles thé Muslims were
descnbed as thé 'infidels'; see Cuoq (1981: 136).
8 The contemporary source is Chihab ed-Din (Arabfaqïh) (1897).
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This policy of co-existence was maintained with minor modifications until thé
reign of Emperor Tewodros (r. 1855-1868), who tried to restore authority after a
period of disunity in the so-called 'Era of Princes' where régional lords were
quasi-independent, despite thé semblance of impérial authority maintained by
nominal emperors at the court in Gondar. In this period, Islamic Oromo
provincial lords in Wollo and Yejju (northern Ethiopia) were the most powerful
éléments in Ethiopia. Emperor Tewodros re-emphasized Orthodox Christianity
again as a programmatic core element in defining Ethiopian nationhood and state
unity (see below).
5. Ethiopian state andfaith: enduring questions of 'national intégration '
As may be evident from the brief histoncal sketch above, Islam has inevitably
been in an inferior position vis-à-vis Orthodox Christianity in Ethiopia in terms
of political influence and cultural dominance (as well as numbers). The Ethiopian
state since thé Aksum period (from thé fourth Century onwards) has been defined
partly through its association with Christianity. The emperor of Ethiopia always
'had to be a Christian' and was the 'Protector' of the Church, while the head of
the Church officiated in the crowning ceremony of the emperors. The Church
was until 1974 also the largest land-owner in the country. But Christianity was
never the officially prescribed 'state religion', and emperors and the clergy were
often at odds on matters of policy, issues of morality, or law and justice.
There was, however, a serions and inherent problem of 'national intégration'
in Ethiopia since the émergence of the imperia! state: central monarchical rule
and its extension over steadily increasing areas with diverse religieus and ethno-
cultural groups increased the challenge of a unitary discourse and an overarching
national identity. This issue was never resolved but only controlled and managed,
with violent means if need be.
As far as the issue of religieus identity was concerned, only emperors
Tewodros (r. 1855-1868) and Yohannis IV (r. 1872-1889) attempted to formally
proscribe the practice of the Islamic religion, endeavounng to enforce mass
conversion to Christianity to enhance national unity. However, despite several
initial campaigns, their edicts had no senous and long-term effect on the religions
situation in Ethiopia. Emperor Minilik II (r. 1889-1913) also hoped for more
rehgious unity, but after a few abortive mass campaigns and revolts he did not
use force or légal measures to achieve it, as long as thé dominance of
Christianity, as thé ideological framework of thé empire, and thé loyalty of élites
were guaranteed. The campaigns of expansion of Emperor Minilik, who at the
end of thé nineteenth century almost doubled thé size of Ethiopia, led him into
many Islamic and other non-Christian areas, for instance the territories of the
Oromo, Sidama, Harari, Somali, Wolayta and Kaficho. In thé course of this
southward movement, several peoples resisting conquest and submission took up
Islam as a résistance ideology against thé Christian overlords, who usually took
away most of their land and destroyed or redirected their economy. The Arssi
Oromo, who live some 200-300 km. south of Addis Ababa, are a case in point
H f
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(Abbas Haji 1992,1993):9 seen by Emperor Minilik first as a target of huge cattle
raids in the early 1880s, their country was conquered in a violent campaign,
during which the Arssi - who until then had had their own traditional religion -
came to identify 'Christianity' (thé religion of the emperor and the large body of
the army) with looting, cruelty, gross injustice and oppression. In their search for
an overarching collective identity beyond their local belief system, Islam was
attractive, as it forged links with groups further removed from them (Somali) but
known to have a tradition of successful armed résistance to invading foes,
According to Abbas (1993) and others, this conquest sowed the seeds of the
failure of the modern Ethiopian nation-state project, despite 40 years of tactical
manoeuvring by Emperor Haile Sellassie (Haylä Sillase) (r. 1930-1974) to
develop a modern, inclusivist state drawing in the different ethnie groups under a
programme of Amharization (in the linguistic sense mainly). In this context,
Islam in Ethiopia had no defining rôle in the formation of national identity, and it
also remained second-class under his regime, although very gradually some
restrictions (in political participation, éducation, célébration of religious
holidays) were lifted.
In this Century, Ethiopia has seen two brief but telling episodes as far as the
inherent tension between Islam and national identity or intégration is concerned,
in the lyasu intermezzo and the Italian occupation.
5.7. The lyasu intermezzo (19J3-1916)
Lijj lyasu was the young inheritor of the Ethiopian throne af ter the death in 1913
of emperor Minilik II (whose grandson hè was). He was the son of a Muslim lord
of Wollo région converted to Christianity. lyasu was politically rather immature
and had no clear policies, except that he tried to integrale Muslims into the
Ethiopian nation-state project. He was a frequent visitor to Muslim chiefs, built
alliances with them (also through inter-marriage or concubinage with their
daughters) and sought to bypass the established Christian elites of central
Ethiopia. He also made contacts with Turkey and with the rebellions Somali
leader Mohammed 'Abdilleh Hassan who fought against the British. This being
the period of the First World War, Allied diplomats in Addis Ababa were also
concerned about the course Ethiopia was taking, and demanded explanations. A
combination of internai and external pressures and military force finally pushed
lyasu (who had never been officially crowned) out of office after only three
years.
5.2. The Italian occupation (1936-1941)
A second important episode in the relations between Ethiopian Muslims and the
state (and with the Christian populations) is that of the Italian occupation. In
these violent years, the Christians of Ethiopia (especially the educated elites and
the Amhara) were singled out for repression. The Amhara in général, who had
migrated to all parts of the country and had acquired land and resources, often
Also the Wollo Oromo: see Mohammed (1994).
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though not exclusively, at the expense of the indigenous population, were in
many areas dismissed, expropriated and forced out by thé Italian government.
The exploitative peasant labour corvée (gabbar) System which still existed in
many areas was ended by thé Itahans, and this was seen as a libération by many
of thé rural underclass. The Italians systematically favoured thé Muslims in
Ethiopia at thé expense of the Christians. They provided füll freedom of religion
for Muslims, stimulated Islamic éducation and thé introduction of Arabie m
schools, built fifty new mosques, and supported Muslim leaders financially
(Hussein 1994: 776). The Muslims thus largely welcomed Italian pohcy, and this
did not endear them to thé Ethiopians fightmg for national libération.
The problems of intégration and of the shaky ideological basis of the unitary
state were also revealed m thé course of the guerrilla war of the Patriots (the
Ethiopian résistance fighters in the provinces) against Italian occupation. They
were mostly Ethiopian Christian highlanders, and after several battles with the
Italians, the retreatmg Ethiopian Patriot forces were attacked and killed by
Muslim Oromo (e.g. in Wollo, cf. McClellan 1995: 70-71), who saw the Italo-
Ethiopian war as none of their business (though they were armed and encouraged
by the Italians) and considered the highland Christians as much their enemies as
the Italians. Such incidents in their turn increased the animosity of highland
Christians towards the 'treacherous Muslims' m the lowlands.
5.3. The post-Haile Sellassie era
After the era of Emperor Haile Sellassie, charactenzed by a pohcy of repressive
tolérance and only a partial granting of nghts to Muslims, the socialist-oriented
military regime (known as Derg) came to power. Under this Derg regime (1974-
1991) there was active discouragement of religion in all its forms, and both
Christianity and Islam were the target of state propaganda and subversion. In the
view of the regime, religion being 'false ideology,' 'backward,' and 'anti-
development,' was systematically weakened The first measures taken aimed to
reverse the pnvileged position of Christianity: for example, the Church lost all its
land, its immovable property was confiscated, and religious éducation m schools
was proscnbed. Policies were devised which aimed at changing the religious
culture of the population. However, the large number of Christians and Muslims
as well as the deep-rooted rehgiosity of most Ethiopians was a social factor
which could not be ignored by the regime, so it settled for a policy of co-
existence and co-optation. It rhetoncally granted religion, especially Islam, a new
public status and equal rights, recognized the most important Christian and
Islamic religious festivals as public hohdays, and tned to give cérémonial
récognition to the two commumties, e.g. by making their leaders appear at state
occasions. But the practical exercise of religion and the social basis of religion
among the population at large was discouraged and sidetracked in many ways.10
10 In the various rebel movements that waged armed struggle against the Derg, Islam
played a rôle as a mobihzing ideology, but these movements (apart from the Afar
movement ALF) never attamed sohd mass support This was the case for example
with the SALF ('Somali Abo Liberation Front') and the WSLF ('Western Somah
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The post-1991 regime of the EPRDF liberalized the political, economie and
cultural climate of the country. Religious freedoms were largely restored,
although the demand of political loyalty - now defined through ethnie allegiance
- was maintained. The present Abunä (head of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church),
installed after 1991 in a controversial 'élection,' is a man from Tigray, the région
from where the reigning political elite of Ethiopia dérives. The present leaders of
the Muslim Community are also often seen as more or less loyalists. However,
résistance to such co-optation within the Muslim Community preceded their
coming to power. The reigning and long-established Suprême Council of Muslim
Affairs in Ethiopia and its controversial vice-chairman11 were challenged by a
newly set up 'Ad Hoc Organizing Committee of Ethiopian Muslim Affairs' to
respect thé décision of the Shari'a court (see note 11). On 21st February 1995,
things came to a head in an unprecedentedly violent incident within the
compound of the al-Anwar Mosque in Addis Ababa (the biggest in the country
and the centre of the Muslim Community). As always in such cases, the
circumstances of the incident have remained very unclear, but worshippers and
the police came to blows and the latter instantly used their fire-arms. In the
ensuing violence, nine people were killed and 129 people wounded.12 There was
never any independent judicial inquiry into the incident. The ultimate effect of
the conflict was a strengthening of the position of regime loyalists. Thus, while
the conflict may have started because of certain internai problems, the
government quickly intervened with rather excessive use of force. The events
seem to indicate that a co-optation of organized Islam continues under the new
political regime.
6. Questions ofidentity
It is obvious from the above that the question of the collective rôle and identity of
Ethiopian Muslims within a predominantly 'Christian state' has never been
resolved.
Interestingly, however, the historical pattern of conflict and conquest of the
border areas between Christianity and Islam in the Ethiopian Middle Ages
(especially in Eastern Shewa, Wollo and Eritrea, the latter then called the 'Bahr
Negash' area) and the shifting boundaries of Islamic and Christian control, has
led to a peculiar pattem of 'flexible' religious identification in the country, which
can be recognized in several areas up to the present. In the course of a lifetime
people may convert from their religion of birth to Christianity or Islam and back.
Liberation Front), both strongly dependent on the Siyad Barre government in Somalia.
Islam became the prédominant factor in neither of these movements. Cf. Krylov
(1990: 174-76).
11 Whose position had been declared null and void by the Shari'a court but who had
stayed on nevertheless. Eye-witnesses in the Mosque stated that when the deposed
vice-chairman (a pro-government man) entered the Mosque that day with his armed
(!) secretary, there was immédiate protest.
12 The official count given in the evening news broadcast of Ethiopian Télévision, 21st
February 1995. Other sources spoke of about 20 people killed.
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Social factors determining this are marriage, trade relations, migration to a city or
an area predominantly inhabited by members adhering to the other religion, and
even (today especially) ethnie or political affiliation.
This cultural phenomenon of what I term religions oscillation has not been
studied systematically13 but is of great interest: it shows not only the varied
forms that Islamic religieus culture can take in an African context (it is found
also e.g. in parts of Nigeria, Cameroon and Mali), but also leads us to inquire into
the nature of (Islamic and Christian) religiosity and into conditions of co-
existence and non-exclusivist identification on the basis of religions usually held
to be exclusivist and - in the case of Islam - not tolerant of conversion to another
faith.
Long-standing cultural affinities between Ethiopian Christians and Muslims
(and others), questions of land inheritance, and social and kinship organization
may have provided the main reason for this pattern of oscillation and for the
religieus tolérance associated with it. Another has undoubtedly been the limited
impact of urban-based 'scriptural religion' as defined and prescribed by the
ulema class, often coming from Arab-Islamic centres of learning: both this class
and important urban centres were absent in pre-twentieth Century Ethiopia, with
the exception of Harar.
7. 'Ethnie dimensions' of Islam
A factor which has enhanced the everyday pattern of tolérance and pragmatic co-
existence between adhérents of the diverse religions may have been that of the
ethnie diversity and the rieh indigenous culture of Ethiopia. An understanding of
Islam in Ethiopia must be grounded not only in the appréhension of the context
of Ethiopian state formation and political authority but also in a study of the
interaction of indigenous culture with the tenets and idiom of the Islamic faith.I4
In anthropological studies on the various ethnie groups of Ethiopia many
varieties and forms of Islamic practice have been described. What is clear is that
Islam and ethnicity are not isomorphic: moreover, among the overwhelmingly
Christian Amhara people, there is a sizeable number of Muslims (in the Gojjam,
Wollo and Gondar régions).
To look at the 'ethnie roots' is also important because several similar cultural
institutions and customs are found across defined ethnie groups, be they of
Christian, Muslim or traditional religion. Characteristic are:
— a blend of 'traditional,' so-called pre- or non-Islamic rituals, practices and
beliefs with 'officiai' Islam. Among thèse can be counted magical practices,
initiation, spirit possession and certain (not all) divination methods. This
Ethiopian (African) heteropraxis has a tenuous legitimacy in the eyes of
orthodox literate Muslims, especially non-Ethiopians.
13 But it will be part of future research m thé Wollo area.
14 A fascinating example of this interaction is described in A. Pankhurst's article
(1994a).
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— the importance of (past) saints and holy men (awliya) and the pilgrimage to
their tombs. This is widespread in Ethiopia (prime examples are the locations
of Sheikh Hussein in Balé, and Faraqasa in the Arssi région). Interestingly, in
Ethiopia Christian pilgrimage places also draw Muslims, and vice versa (for
one example see Abebe 1995: 31-32). Ethnie and religious boundaries often
blurr in thé worship of many such pilgrimage sites (see Pankhurst 1994b).
— thé important rôle of the Sufi mystics and orders (pi. turug). These have also
been important in the spread of Islam, e.g. thé Qadiriyya (since thé sixteenth
Century), and thé Sammaniya and Tijaniyya (nineteenth century). Conversion
in many areas meant becoming member of a Sufi order. Among groups
where traditional initiation and ritual feil into disuse (perhaps in thé western
Oromo areas), the entrance into a tariqa (Sufi order) was the logical
alternative. The rôle of the turuqin Ethiopia, is however, another subject on
which remarkably little is known (see Trimingham 1952, and Abebe 1995 for
some récent information).
Islam in Ethiopia has been moulded by thèse and other éléments from thé cultural
and ethnie traditions of the country. The Ethiopian societal context has, so to
speak, forced thé idea of 'pluralism' not only on the minds of the country's
Christians but also on that of its Muslims.
These phenomena also raise the question of the relation between 'folk Islam'
and 'scriptural Islam,' 'saint' and 'doctor,' to refer to thé well-known though
controversial point made by E. Gellner on Muslim society (Gellner 1981: 114f.).
In its original formulation, this dichotomy may have been too 'essentialist,' but it
does point to an undeniable status hierarchy in Islam. In an interesting analysis of
thé Argobba Muslims in Ethiopia, Abebe (1995: 29) has claimed that both pôles
in Gellner's model are not only complementary (and can be mediated by Sufi
orders), but can also be interpreted within thé framework of Islamic orthodoxy.
Without pursuing this discussion hère, I want to make thé point that in thé
areas of this above-mentioned symbiotic and oscillating religious identification,
one sees a form of non-literate folk Islam which does go against the grain of
strict Islamic uléma doctrine: if strictly applied, Islam, in this view, 'should not
allow' this kind of flexible behaviour.
Indeed, in récent years, after thé 1991 change of régime, thèse very patterns of
tolérance (in Wollo and elsewhere) have been the target of a movement of
itinérant teachers/preachers of 'true Islam.' In 1994 during interviews in the
Aliyu Amba area (a traditional mixed border-area in east-central Ethiopia where
Islamic and Christian people live together in the villages), it was remarkd to me
by some people that their village had been visited by persons who came and
asked them to reduce their contacts and co-operation with the Christians, and to
reinforce the 'Muslim character' of their village and their way of life.
Schlee (1994: 988-999), in an important study of changing relationships
between Boran, Gabbra, Garri and Somali in southern Ethiopia, has in a similar
vein noted the problems of a new Islamic identity intersecting with ethnicity,
disturbing the local co-existence of groups.
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It is likely that such local-level developments - which can, however, only be
understood in the changing configuration of a globalizing Islam that is expanding
under new social and political conditions - will reshape the social fabric of
Islamic societies in Ethiopia and the nature of Muslim identity and identification
in the country. Villagers will be drawn into a wider debate, initiated by globally
oriented scriptural Islamic community leaders or missionaries, on Islamic ideals
and practice. The present climate in Ethiopia of politicizing everything, from
personal identity and choice of friends to economie activity and elementary
development work, will enhance this development.
& Prospects
In an economie sense, the Ethiopian regime is at present making an accelerated
effort to insert itself in the global economy: it liberalizes markets, invites foreign
private investment, co-operates with the IMF and World Bank in a Structural
Adjustment Facility, privatizes state companies, and devolves central state power
to régions, all the time, however, maintaining the 'ethnie balance' in its own
favour. People from the northern Tigray région and loyalists from other groups
control the key positions in national politics and business, and religious
organizations of Christians and Muslims are largely co-opted.15 The political
discourse in present-day Ethiopia, after the démise of the Ethio-Communist
Mengistu-regime with its meta-narrative of state-socialism, areligiosity and the
unitary state, has dissolved all conflicts and social issues of nation-wide
importance into ethnicity. Ethnie identity is - rightly or wrongly - seen and
defined by the Ethiopian regime as the determinant of political debate, of
economie and educational policy, and of régional and local administration. It is
held to be the 'vessel' or prism through which people's democratie rights are
realized. Religious identification has also been drawn into this: one is not Muslim
or Christian but one is Oromo or Afar Muslim and Amhara or Gurage Christian.
There is, however, a struggle for allegiance going on between religion and
ethnicity.
Except in a formal manner, the question of national intégration or cohésion is
hardly posed in Ethiopia: each ethnie (and religious) community has been
accorded the right and duty to manage its own affairs in the shadow of a fédéral
government providing thé semblance of unity. The models and ideals of
searching for common ground and patterns of trans-regional, trans-ethnic and
trans-religious co-operation are de-emphasized, in view of the past problems
posed by diversity, suppression and social inequality. This is perhaps an
interesting societal model: it carries a radical récognition of diversity and of a
15 It is ironie that at present the largest private Investor in Ethiopia today is a Muslim
business tycoon, Mohammed al-Amudi (from an Ethiopian-Saudi family), thé
wealthiest man in thé région, with an extending global network of interests. He does
not style himself as a Muslim revivalist but primarily as an Ethiopian of Muslim faith
committed to national development and business. He has funded Muslim educational
programmes and thé building of many mosques in Ethiopia, but his charitable trust
also supports Christian and non-denominational social or educational projects.
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new kind of equality. It also opens up a potentially destabilizing dynamics of
parochial identity formation and sectarian counter-discourse along ethnie and
religieus lines.
However, since 1991 Ethiopian Muslims do have more rights and more
breathing space, compared with earlier periods. They have also achieved virtual
parity with the Christians, except in numbers. They are also no more réticent in
claiming their rightful place in Ethiopian society. Evidence of this was, for
instance, the big public démonstration by tens of thousands of Muslims in the
capital on 28th November 1994, advancing the demands of the Muslim
Community to the government.
An important sign is that Ethiopian Muslims are more involved in emerging
debates in the independent press16 on the history and rôle of their religious
Community in Ethiopia and in the world (see Carmichael 1997). They are also
more exposed to contacts with the wider Islamic world: more Ethiopian Muslims
travel to study and work there, the quota for the Hajj is enormously increased,
and Islamic activists, scholars and teachers from the Middle East come to
Ethiopia to work and promote their view of Islam. Iranian, Saudi and some
Libyan groups are active in this respect (also in missionizing).17
With regard to the rôle and identity of Ethiopian Muslims the question could
be asked whether in the present era of decentred national identity and redefined
modernity a strenger overarching trans-national religious identity will develop,
and whether one will see a politicization of Islam in the form of
'fundamentalism' or a broad social and cultural movement of revivalism.
Fundamentalism I define hère as an ideological programme or world-view
characterized by:
— an unquestioned belief in own-group superiority on the basis of 'revealed
truths' derived from scriptures (laying down supernatural, 'eternal' truths);
— hierarchization and boundary-setting between 'us' and 'mem';
— both exclusivism and expansionism toward the outside world, often defined
as polluted and defiled but to be cleansed, reformed, and redefined on a basis
of immutable ideas (dogmas) of 'certainty.'
In practical terms, this world-view and social programme implies the use of all
possible means to spread these certainties (through conversion campaigns, often
dramatic and radical) to the rest of society, increase numbers, and bend thé
political System to its ends. As such the above désignation applies to, for
instance, its Hindu, Christian or Islamic varieties.
16 Three Islamic magazines - in Amhanc, with some Arabie sections - have been
foundedsince 1991.
17 There is no doubt that thé actively missionizing 'Islamic Call' (ad-Dawwa al-
Islatniyyà) Movement, headquartered in Khartoum, is active in Ethiopia, but Sudanese
influence has dwindled greatly since thé failed assassination attempt by Sudanese and
Egyptian Islamists on Egyptian président Mubarak in Addis Ababa m 1995, after
which Ethiopia froze relations with thé al-Bashir government and sent home many
Sudanese nationals.
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In this respect, 'fundamentalism' in its Islamic form exists^on a state levéliia
Africa only in Sudan (with its National Islamic Front government), whiîe other? *f i%fii ^ ^ ?
movements are active in Älgeria, Egypt, Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, ̂ Somalia,
Senegal and a few other countries. In Ethiopia such a movement isolent," ând
will not find fertile ground for any mass allegiance.18 My hyp^tnesis is thus that
social and cultural conditions for thé émergence of political^ Islam in a
'fundamentalist' or, better, Islamist form are not good in Ethiopia. Ethnicity,
socio-économie factors and the spécifie nature of the Ethiopian state (especially
in its present federalized form)19 will transect any homogenizing tendencies of an
'Islamic identity' on a collective basis. However, Islamic revivalism and the
striving for and maintaining of füll equal rights for Muslims as citizens in a post-
ideological,20 'ethnicized' Ethiopia will continue (paralleling renewal
developments in thé Orthodox Christian Church, and especially in Pentecostal
movements in Ethiopia). Whether this quest will ultimately take a political form
is doubtful. The Ethiopian government has become embroiled in verbal warfare
with thé Islamist regime in Sudan and in actual armed struggle in Somalia against
some Islamist Somali groups like Al-Ittihad, operating in the southern border
area. The government also keeps a close watch on similar-minded groups in
Ethiopia like the IFLO (= Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia), a minority
Muslim movement among the Oromo with an exclusivist and anti-Christian
programme. The initial openness of the present government toward the Muslim
world and toward Islamic revival in Ethiopia may thus be gradually reversed.
Furthermore, if in the longer term the ethnicity-oriented state policy fails, Islam
may become a major vehicle for mobilizing political, economie and ethno-
regional groups in Ethiopia. The context of Islam as a global narrative will prove
to be essential here in further defining the self-image and socio-political rôle of
the Muslims in Ethiopia.
In view of the above, the process of Islamic revival in Ethiopia - as evident in
the new written media, self-organization and proselytizing - together with the
forms of expression of Islamic identities among the various major ethnie groups
of the country will provide a fruitful as well as urgent area of study.
JON ABBINK may be contacted at the Afrika-Studiecentrum, P.O. Box 9555,
2300 RB Leiden, the Netherlands (e-mail: abbink@rulfsw.fsw.LeidenVniv.nl,
fax: (+) 31-71-5723344).
18 In Eritrea small groups exist. They hâve partly emerged from thé defeated ELF
(Entrean Liberation Front, a Muslim-dommated movement) in thé early 1980s (see
Tesfatsion 1994: 78-80). At présent there is an Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement
active, formed in 1988, with bases m Sudan and supported by thé NIF-regime (despite
thé latter's habituai déniais).
19 In which Islamic parties are - as in Eritrea - forbidden. Neither has there been a
clamour among thé public for 'Islamic' (or 'Christian') political parties, as for
example m Kenya.
20 I.e. non-Christian (up to 1974) and non-Communist/Socialist (up to 1991) Ethiopia.
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